Locus of Control is a psychological term referring to whether a person believes that, in a given situation, they control the outcome (internal locus of control), or if they are being forced into a given outcome by the circumstances (external locus of control). Here, it is applied to college football defensive coordinators.

Defensively, belief in an internal locus of control would lead a coordinator to create a system and scheme wherein the defense attacks the offense, and forces them into making adjustments to the defenders. Belief in an external locus of control would consist of soft zone teams, and schemes that are primarily based upon a read-and-react ideology. Of course, offenses go into every given play with either a run or pass called, so the defense does not have quite the autonomy that an offensive team might have.

Defensive coordinators who believe in a scheme that places faith in an external locus of control are those who run almost all zones, and believe that their superior execution can prevent opponents from moving the ball down the field and scoring. In defensive fronts and linebackers, former Michigan defensive coordinator Jim Herrmann’s “read and react” ideology is the perfect example of external locus of control. By definition, you think the offense controls the play, and you hope to stop what they are doing after it begins its progress.

At the other end of the spectrum is the internal locus of control. Defensive coordinators that utilize heavy blitzing are certainly believers in this. The blitzes are designed to force the offense into changing what it wants to do. For running, that would be cause the running back to say “oh shit, I’m screwed,” and for passing, it would be either sacking the quarterback or forcing him to make a bad throw (or one that doesn’t get his team a first down). Along the front, internal locus of control coordinators would like their defensive linemen to play downhill and get after the quarterback or running back.

So which type of defensive philosophy is better? It really all depends. If a team has superior athletes, it can easily sit back in a zone and play bend-not-break principles. On the other hand, it can also play aggressively, and rack up a lot of negative plays for the opposing offense – but likely give up a big play or two the other way. With inferior talent, it will be hard for defensive linemen or blitzers to get through blockers (without sending so many men as to risk giving up an easy big play to the other team), so they are more likely to play soft, and hope they can not break, or come up with some stops. Like pretty much everything in football strategy, a mix of the two ideals is preferable.

In 2006 and 2007, Michigan defensive coordinator Ron English played with a balanced defensive system. From some games, it is apparent that he preferred to attack, believing in an internal locus of control. However, over the course of both seasons, it seems as though he wasn’t always allowed to run the defense the way he wanted, and the overall coaching philosophy of the program was to play it a little more safely.

In 2008, new Michigan defensive coordinator Scott Shafer will run a defensive scheme that believes wholeheartedly in an internal locus of control. His teams will blitz heavily, and place an emphasis on getting into the backfield to take down the running back or quarterback. This aggressive philosophy (especially with Michigan’s veteran defensive front) will allow Michigan to rack up many tackles for loss, but could also result in big plays given up to the opposition. However, as he told me earlier this year, the scheme will also react to what the offense is doing (though I believe he meant that as more of a formational adjustment, not an adjustment to the plays the offense is running).

Posted under Coaching

Locus of Control is a psychological term referring to whether a person believes that, in a given situation, they control the outcome (internal locus of control), or if they are being forced into a given outcome by the circumstances (external locus of control). Here, it is applied to college football defensive coordinators.

On the offensive end, locus of control is not necessarily an indicator of aggressiveness or run/pass ratio. Bo Schembechler, for example, believed very strongly in an internal locus of control (note: this specifically refers to years when the option was not heavily featured). His philosophy was to run down the opposition’s throat, and put a hat on a hat and beat the guy on the other side of the line. This was a very run-heavy offense. On the other end of the spectrum is the sort of team that tries to force the action by moving the ball downfield. USC’s 2003-05 offense was a good example of this. With confidence in Matt Leinart, Norm Chow, Steve Sarkisian, and Lane Kiffin were able to throw down the field with great success. As John David Booty showed over the next two years, however, this method is less likely to succeed with lower talent at the QB position.

At the other end of the locus of control spectrum lies external. This would be coaches taking what the defense gives them. These types of offense can succeed with less talent (specifically at the QB position in passing offenses) , and excel with great talent. A run-heavy team that relies on belief in an external locus of control would be Nebraska 1995. With Tommie Frazier at the helm, the Huskers ran an option attack. The base belief of the option is to hand off, pitch, or keep, reacting to what the defense will give you. In a passing attack, Purdue under Joe Tiller and Hawaii under June Jones are perfect examples of belief in external locus of control. These offenses rely heavily on bubble screens and short routes that the offense is willing to give up to avoid allowing the ball to be hurled downfield. Nickel-and-diming to score is their focus. This type of offense can succeed with less success at quarterback (see: Curtis Painter, Colt Brennan).

The ideal offense is a healthy mixture of believing in external and internal loci. Setting up the play-action with the run (play-action incorporates both controls, by forcing th defense to react in one way, then breaking their expectations), throwing both downfield and short passes, etc., seems to be the best way to run an offense that is both explosive and consistent (explosive=internal, consistent=external). LSU in 2007, despite not having a great offense, was able to blend the two beliefs very well, resulting in a high-scoring but consistent team. While we’re on the topic of LSU, going for fourth downs a la Les Miles would be belief in internal locus of control, rather than external, in which you take the field goal (which the defense is “giving you”).

On to recent Michigan teams. Michigan has been a fairly evenly-balanced run-pass team during the Lloyd Carr era. However, especially with Mike Debord, there has been a nearly-singular belief in an internal locus of control. “Hey man, we’re going to run left twice, no matter what you do” was the Mike Debord gameplan for seemingly every first down in 2007. Obviously, the Florida game was an exception, when Michigan had a nearly perfect gameplan: a healthy mix of run and pass, and a healthy mix of internal and external locus of control in both segments of the offense. For the rest of the year, however, Lloyd Carr preferred to adhere to an internal locus of control, while running the ball to “protect the defense.”

In 2008, it can be presumed that Rich Rodriguez will bring an offensive style that is at least similar to the one West Virginia has run in past years, even though the talent isn’t distributed among the skill positions in a similar manner at Michigan that it was at WVU. This means the offense will be slightly run-heavy (though there will likely be more passing than there has been at WVU in recent years), with a very strong belief in an external locus of control. This is an option offense that looks to capitalize on what the defense is doing, rather than forcing its will upon the defenders.

This is very much focused on taking what the defense gives you. So, look for Michigan’s offense in 2008 to be a slightly run-heavy externally-controlled spread-option attack.

Posted under Coaching